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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 15-4001 
_____________ 
  
DAVID OPALINSKI; JAMES MCCABE, on behalf of themselves and all others 
similarly situated, 
 
   Appellants 
       
v. 
 
ROBERT HALF INTERNATIONAL INC; ROBERT HALF CORPORATION; 
STEPHEN SONNENBERG 
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey 
 (D.C. Civil Action No. 2-10-cv-02069) 
District Judge: Honorable Madeline C. Arleo 
______________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
September 15, 2016 
 
Before: CHAGARES, GREENAWAY, JR., and RESTREPO, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: January 30, 2017) 
 
______________ 
 
OPINION* 
______________ 
 
 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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RESTREPO, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Plaintiffs David Opalinski and James McCabe challenge the District Court’s 
dismissal of their collective action complaint brought pursuant to the Fair Labor 
Standards Act.  We agree with the District Court’s finding that Plaintiffs’ employment 
agreements do not provide for class1 arbitration, and, therefore, we will affirm.   
I 
Defendants Robert Half International, Inc. and Robert Half Corp. (“Defendants”) 
are collectively an international staffing agency that employs managers who sell job 
placement services.  Plaintiffs David Opalinski and James McCabe (“Plaintiffs”) are two 
former staffing managers who worked for Defendants in New Jersey.  Plaintiffs filed 
their original lawsuit against Defendants in the District of New Jersey in 2010, claiming 
that Defendants misclassified them as overtime-exempt employees in violation of the Fair 
Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq., and that they should be 
classified as non-exempt employees entitled to overtime pay.  Plaintiffs sought to pursue 
individual claims as well as collective action claims on behalf of thousands of Robert 
Half staffing managers.   
Plaintiffs had signed employment agreements with Defendants, which contained 
arbitration clauses.  McCabe’s agreement, which he signed in August 2001, provided in 
relevant part: 
                                              
1 The term “class,” as used throughout this opinion and the parties’ briefing, is 
intended to encompass groups of plaintiffs organized as either class actions or collective 
actions. 
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Any dispute or claim arising out of or relating to Employee’s 
employment, termination of employment or any provision of 
this Agreement, whether based on contract or tort or 
otherwise (except for any dispute involving alleged breach of 
the obligations contained in Sections 8, 9, 10, 11, or 13 
hereof) shall be submitted to arbitration pursuant to the 
commercial arbitration rules of the American Arbitration 
Association.  
 
JA89.  Opalinski’s agreement, which he signed in February 2002, provided in relevant 
part: 
Employer and Employee agree that, to the fullest extent 
permitted by law, any dispute or claim arising out of or 
relating to Employee’s employment, termination of 
employment or any provision of this Agreement, whether 
based on contract or tort or otherwise (except for any dispute 
involving alleged breach of the obligations contained in 
Sections 8, 9, 10, 11 or 13 hereof) shall be submitted to 
arbitration pursuant to the commercial arbitration rules of the 
American Arbitration Association. Claims subject to 
arbitration shall include contract claims, tort claims, or claims 
related to compensation, as well as claims based on any 
federal, state or local law, statute, or regulation, including but 
not limited to claims arising under the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
The Americans with Disabilities Act, the California Fair 
Employment and Housing Act (for California Employees), 
and comparable equal opportunity statutes for employees in 
other states. However, claims for unemployment 
compensation, workers’ compensation, and claims under the 
National Labor Relations Act shall not be subject to 
arbitration.  
 
JA81. 
 
After filing an Answer to the Complaint in May 2010, Defendants moved the 
District Court in July 2011 to compel arbitration, pursuant to the arbitration clauses 
above, and dismiss the case.  In their motion, Defendants asked the District Court to 
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compel arbitration on an individual basis.  The District Court granted the motion in part, 
compelling arbitration and dismissing the case, but not compelling individual arbitrations.  
Instead, the District Court held that the arbitrator, rather than the court, should be the one 
to decide whether the case would proceed on an individual or class basis, because the 
parties’ agreements did not expressly address the issue.  Plaintiffs then filed a Demand 
for Arbitration with the American Arbitration Association.   
The assigned arbitrator first considered the threshold issue of whether the parties’ 
employment agreements authorized class arbitration, and concluded in May 2012 that 
they did.  In June 2012, Defendants moved the District Court, pursuant to the Federal 
Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4), to vacate the arbitrator’s decision.2  In 
December 2012, the District Court denied the motion to vacate.  Defendants timely 
appealed that denial to this Court.   
In July 2014, this Court held in a precedential opinion that the availability of class 
arbitration was an issue for the court, rather than an arbitrator, to decide.  A petition for 
rehearing en banc was denied, as was a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court.  So 
the case was remanded back to the District Court for a determination of whether the 
parties’ employment agreements authorized class arbitration.   
After the case was remanded, Defendants moved the District Court to dismiss the 
action on the grounds that the agreements did not authorize class arbitration.  In 
                                              
2 The FAA provides that upon a party’s motion, a district court situated in the 
district where an arbitration award was made “may make an order vacating the award” if 
it finds that an arbitrator “exceeded [his or her] powers.”  9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4). 
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November 2015, the District Court granted Defendants’ motion with prejudice, deciding 
that the agreements did not allow Plaintiffs to arbitrate their claims on a class-wide basis.  
Plaintiffs then filed this timely appeal.   
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  This Court has 
jurisdiction over the District Court’s final decision pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 16, because it 
concerned an arbitration that is subject to the FAA.  See Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. 
Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 86 (2000).  “We exercise plenary review over questions 
regarding the . . . enforceability of an agreement to arbitrate” and over the District 
Court’s legal determinations regarding arbitrability.  Quilloin v. Tenet HealthSystem 
Philadelphia, Inc., 673 F.3d 221, 228 (3d Cir. 2012).   
II 
 Plaintiffs present two issues on appeal: (A) whether the availability of class 
arbitration is for the court or the arbitrator to decide; and (B) whether the District Court 
erred in determining that the parties’ agreements do not permit class arbitration.  We 
address each in turn below.  
A 
 As to the first issue, this Court has already explicitly decided, in a precedential 
opinion in this same case, that the question of arbitrability of class claims is for the court, 
not the arbitrator, to decide.  Opalinski v. Robert Half Int’l Inc., 761 F.3d 326, 335–36 
(3d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1530 (2015).  We cannot revisit this issue, 
consistent with our well-established Internal Operating Procedures, which prohibit a 
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panel of this Court from overruling an earlier binding panel decision.  See Third Circuit 
Internal Operating Procedure 9.1.3   
B 
Turning to the second issue – whether the parties’ agreements permit class 
arbitration – the Supreme Court has made clear that “a party may not be compelled . . . to 
submit to class arbitration unless there is a contractual basis for concluding that the party 
agreed to do so.”  Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 684 
(2010).  The parties do not dispute that the employment agreements at issue here were 
“silent” as to class arbitration.  Instead, the parties’ dispute centers on whether, 
notwithstanding this “silence,” the arbitration clauses can still be read to “agree” to class 
arbitration. 
Defendants argue that where there is no explicit mention of class arbitration in an 
employment contract, courts typically hold that there has been no agreement to class 
arbitration.  Indeed, Defendants find support for their argument in Quilloin, in which this 
Court noted that “[s]ilence regarding class arbitration generally indicates a prohibition.”  
673 F.3d at 232.  Several other Circuits, including the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and 
Ninth, have likewise stated that “silence” in an agreement regarding class arbitration 
generally indicates that it is not authorized by the agreement.  See, e.g., Eshagh v. 
Terminix Int’l Co., 588 F. App’x 703, 704 (9th Cir. 2014) (affirming the district court’s 
                                              
 3 “It is the tradition of this court that the holding of a panel in a precedential 
opinion is binding on subsequent panels.  Thus, no subsequent panel overrules the 
holding in a precedential opinion of a previous panel.  Court en banc consideration is 
required to do so.”  Third Circuit Internal Operating Procedure 9.1.   
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grant of a motion to strike class allegations, where the arbitration agreement did not 
mention class arbitration); Reed Elsevier, Inc. ex rel. LexisNexis Div. v. Crockett, 734 
F.3d 594, 599 (6th Cir. 2013) (“The principal reason to conclude that this arbitration 
clause does not authorize classwide arbitration is that the clause nowhere mentions it.”); 
Reed v. Fla. Metro. Univ., Inc., 681 F.3d 630, 643−44 (5th Cir. 2012) (finding that 
silence in an agreement does not “constitute[] consent to class arbitration” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)), abrogated on other grounds by Oxford Health Plans LLC v. 
Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064 (2013); Dominium Austin Partners, L.L.C. v. Emerson, 248 F.3d 
720, 728−29 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding that the district court did not err by compelling 
individual, rather than class, arbitration because the relevant agreements were silent as to 
class arbitration); Champ v. Siegel Trading Co., 55 F.3d 269, 275 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating 
“the FAA forbids federal judges from ordering class arbitration where the parties’ 
arbitration agreement is silent on the matter”).   
Plaintiffs contend, however, that the absence of explicit language authorizing class 
arbitration in an employment agreement is not fatal to class claims, because authorization 
can be implicit in nature.  Put differently, if an arbitration clause reflects the parties’ 
intent to agree to class arbitration, then it should be permitted, even where class 
arbitration is not explicitly mentioned anywhere in the contract.  According to Plaintiffs, 
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this implicit authorization can be found in their employment agreements by applying 
New Jersey contract law, which follows the ordinary rules of contract interpretation.4   
The District Court agreed with Defendants that the absence of any explicit 
mention of class arbitration in the employment agreements weighed against a finding that 
it was authorized by the agreements.  The District Court then went on to consider whether 
consent to class arbitration could be inferred from the agreements, in the absence of 
express authorization, and found that it could not.  We agree with the reasoned decision 
of the District Court.  Even assuming arguendo that class arbitration may be permitted 
without express authorization in an arbitration clause, Plaintiffs have set forth nothing 
suggestive of any implicit intent to permit class arbitration here.  
Plaintiffs offer several textual arguments in support of their position that their 
agreements reflect the parties’ intent to arbitrate class claims.  First, Plaintiffs argue that 
the clause “‘[a]ny dispute or claim arising out of or relating to Employee’s employment’ 
shall be submitted to binding arbitration” is intentionally broad and designed to 
encompass class or collective actions.  Br. of Appellants 19 (quoting JA81, 89).  But 
Plaintiffs’ argument misses a critical point: the agreement specifies that the dispute or 
claim must arise out of or relate to the particular employee’s employment, not any 
employee’s employment.  Further, the Supreme Court was clear in Stolt-Nielsen that 
“[a]n implicit agreement to authorize class-action arbitration” cannot be inferred “solely 
                                              
4 Plaintiffs do not argue that either federal law or New Jersey law contains a 
“default” class arbitration rule to be applied in the absence of an agreement.  See Stolt-
Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 676−77. 
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from the fact of the parties’ agreement to arbitrate.”  Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 685; see 
also Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064, 2071−72 (2013) (Alito, J., 
concurring) (suggesting, without deciding, that an arbitrator had “improperly inferred 
‘[a]n implicit agreement to authorize class-action arbitration’” from an agreement’s “any 
dispute” language, which was nothing more than “the parties’ agreement to arbitrate” 
(quoting Stolt-Nielson, 559 U.S. at 685)).  On its face, the “any dispute” language in 
Plaintiffs’ agreements shows only the parties’ general intent to arbitrate their disputes.  
We cannot infer an intent to arbitrate class claims on this basis. 
Second, Plaintiffs point to the following language in Mr. Opalinski’s agreement as 
evidence of an intent to arbitrate class claims: 
[C]laims related to compensation, as well as claims based on 
any federal, state or local law, statute, or regulation, including 
but not limited to claims arising under the Age Discrimination 
in Employment Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
The Americans with Disabilities Act, the California Fair 
Employment and Housing Act (for California employees), 
and comparable equal opportunity statutes for employees in 
other states.   
 
Br. of Appellants 21 (quoting JA81).  Plaintiffs argue that because all of the specific 
statutes listed in this sentence allow for class litigation, and litigants often bring class 
claims under these statutes, the inclusion of this sentence suggests that the parties 
intended to permit class arbitration.  We find this argument unavailing.  The statutes 
listed – like many statutes and common law causes of action – allow for both class and 
individual claims, so the agreement’s reference to them sheds no more light on the 
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parties’ intent to arbitrate class claims than the “any dispute” language discussed above.5   
Likewise, the exclusion of certain other substantive claims – which presumably could 
take the form of individual or class claims – from the arbitration requirement adds 
nothing to our understanding of the parties’ intent to allow class arbitration.6   
We are equally unpersuaded by Plaintiffs’ remaining arguments.  Plaintiffs 
contend that the agreements incorporated the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”) 
rules, and a supplement to the rules provides that the AAA will administer class 
arbitrations; therefore, according to Plaintiffs, the agreements contemplate class 
arbitration.  But these rules did not exist in 2001 and 2002, when the parties signed the 
employment agreements, so they cannot be used as evidence of the parties’ intent.  For 
the same reason, evidence that class arbitration was customary after 2003 in the context 
                                              
5 It is likely that the parties referenced these “equal opportunity statutes” by name 
because certain jurisdictions will not uphold an agreement to arbitrate statutory 
employment discrimination claims unless they are specifically and unambiguously 
included in an arbitration clause.  See, e.g., Garfinkel v. Morristown Obstetrics & 
Gynecology Assoc., 773 A.2d 665, 672 (N.J. 2001) (stating that New Jersey courts should 
“not assume that employees intend to waive [their rights to sue under the New Jersey 
Law Against Discrimination] unless their agreements so provide in unambiguous terms”). 
 
6 The arbitration clauses in both agreements specify that “any dispute or claim 
arising out of or relating to Employee’s employment” shall be submitted to arbitration  . . 
. (except for any dispute involving alleged breach of the obligations contained in Sections 
8, 9, 10, 11 or 13 hereof).”  JA81, 89 (emphasis added).  The “Sections” noted refer to a 
confidentiality clause, a non-compete clause, internal and external non-solicitation 
clauses, and a clause pertaining to the post-termination use of the employer’s name.  Mr. 
Opalinski’s employment agreement also states that claims for unemployment 
compensation, worker’s compensation, and claims under the National Labor Relations 
Act were exempt from the arbitration requirement.  JA81.  At least some of these claims 
may be expressly excluded from the arbitration requirement because they cannot be 
arbitrated as a matter of law in many jurisdictions.  See, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:15-49 
(giving the Division of Worker’s Compensation “exclusive original jurisdiction [over] all 
claims for worker’s compensation benefits”). 
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of wage claims is irrelevant to the parties’ intent here.  See Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 673 
n.4 (suggesting that class arbitration was uncommon before 2003, when the AAA 
adopted its Class Rules).   
Plaintiffs contend next that under New Jersey law, the rule of contra proferentem 
dictates that ambiguous terms of adhesion contracts, like the employment agreements, 
should be construed against the drafter.  But as Defendants point out, this doctrine of 
contract interpretation should only be employed as a “last resort,” after a court has 
already examined the contract’s terms, exhausted other accepted methods of contract 
construction, and it still cannot determine the meaning of an ambiguous term.  See 
Pacifico v. Pacifico, 920 A.2d 73, 78 (N.J. 2007).  That is not the case here, where there 
is no textual support in the employment agreements for Plaintiffs’ suggested 
interpretation and there is ample case law suggesting class arbitration is inappropriate in 
these circumstances.   
Finally, Plaintiffs urge this Court to hold that class action waivers in arbitration 
agreements, which have the effect of barring class actions, are unconscionable and 
invalid under New Jersey law and the National Labor Relations Act.  Plaintiffs did not 
raise these arguments before the District Court, so they have waived the opportunity to 
raise them on appeal.7  Birdman v. Office of the Governor, 677 F.3d 167, 173 (3d Cir. 
2012) (“It is axiomatic that ‘arguments asserted for the first time on appeal are deemed to 
                                              
7 We cannot agree with Plaintiffs’ suggestion that footnotes 3 and 4 of their 
response brief to Defendants’ Motion to Vacate the arbitration award put the District 
Court on notice of these arguments.   
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be waived and consequently are not susceptible to review in this Court absent exceptional 
circumstances.’” (quoting Tri-M Grp., LLC v. Sharp, 638 F.3d 406, 416 (3d Cir. 2011))). 
III 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s dismissal of this 
action with prejudice.  
